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Abstract
Individuals vary considerably in how much they earn during their lifetimes. We study
how the tax-and-transfer system offsets inequalities in lifetime earnings, which would oth-
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that redistribution by taxes and transfers offsets 54% of the inequality in lifetime earnings
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younger would strengthen the insurance and redistributive functions of social assistance.
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1 Introduction
The inequality of lifetime earnings is a key barometer of disparities in living standards. Indeed,
to the degree that individuals can save and borrow, the inequality of lifetime earnings cap-
tures fundamental economic disparities more accurately than the inequality of annual earnings.
Motivated by this observation, a growing literature has started to document the inequality of
lifetime earnings. Despite the mobility of individuals in the earnings distribution, the inequality
of lifetime earnings is substantial: Bo¨nke et al. (2015) find that the distribution of the lifetime
earnings of German men has a Gini coefficient around 0.2, and Guvenen et al. (2017) find that
the 75th percentile of the lifetime earnings of American workers is around three times higher
than the 25th percentile. Based on decompositions of the inequality of lifetime earnings, several
studies have shown that the inequality in lifetime earnings is due to a combination of differ-
ences inli skill endowments that are allotted early in life and chance differences in the shocks
that individuals experience during their lifetimes (e.g., Bowlus and Robin, 2004, Huggett et al.,
2011).
In this paper, we study how well the tax-and-transfer system mitigates the inequalities in
lifetime earnings that are due to endowments and we show how the tax-and-transfer system
moderates the disparities in lifetime earnings that are due to shocks. We call the former effect
the redistributive effect of the tax-and-transfer system and we call the latter effect the insurance
effect of the tax-and-transfer system. While previous studies have shown that the inequality
of lifetime after-tax-and-transfer earnings (i.e., lifetime income) is lower than the inequality of
lifetime earnings, we separately study how the tax-and-transfer system redistributes lifetime
earnings and how it insures lifetime earnings risk.
There are three reasons why it is important to separate the insurance and redistributive
effects of the tax-and-transfer system on lifetime income. First, information about the redis-
tributive effect of the tax-and-transfer system speaks to how well taxes and transfers mitigate
increases in the inequality of lifetime earnings that are driven by economic shifts that increase
the returns to skill endowments. Relevant shifts include technological change that favors high
ability workers and changes in the pattern of international trade that drive up the wage premium
for a college degree. Second, studying how well taxes and transfers insure lifetime earnings risk
highlights additional benefits from taxation, social assistance (or ‘welfare’) programs, and so-
cial insurance programs, such as unemployment insurance and disability benefits, compared
to benefit calculations that focus on the effects of these programs on annual income or other
short-term income measures. Third, by documenting the insurance and redistributive effects
of the tax-and-transfer system, we are able to identify directions for policy reforms to taxes
and social assistance that may improve the lifetime insurance and redistributive effects of the
tax-and-transfer system.
Our empirical analysis focuses on Germany. In line with most developed countries, the
German tax-and-transfer system features progressive taxes, disability benefits that are available
to people who are experiencing bad health, unemployment insurance that provides temporary
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income replacement following a job loss, and social assistance that provides long-term support
to low-income wealth-poor individuals. We study the link between lifetime earnings, taxes and
transfers, and lifetime income by embedding a tax-and-transfer system based on the German
system into a dynamic life-cycle model of labor supply and consumption behavior. The model
generates individual-level trajectories for earnings and after-tax-and-transfer income over the
life cycle. The model thus provides the information that is needed to calculate lifetime earnings
and lifetime income on an individual-by-individual basis. The model includes two key drivers
of disparities in lifetime earnings: differences in skill endowments, specifically education and
productive ability, and differences in the employment, health, and wage shocks that individuals
encounter during their lifetimes.
We estimate the parameters of the life-cycle model by using a Maximum Likelihood proce-
dure that targets the patterns of labor supply and earnings that we observe in a sample of men
taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). We demonstrate that the estimated
model has good in-sample fit. We also perform a validation exercise that shows that inequal-
ity in lifetime earnings predicted by the estimated model matches the inequality in lifetime
earnings observed in a comparable administrative dataset that was not used for estimation.
We find that the tax-and-transfer system is strongly progressive on a lifetime basis, despite
taxes and transfers being based on annual earnings. Both insurance and redistribution con-
tribute to the progressive effect of the tax-and-transfer system on lifetime income. In particular,
we find that the tax-and-transfer system mitigates 54% of the inequality in lifetime earnings
that is due to shocks that individuals experience during their lives. Meanwhile, our results
on redistribution suggest that the tax-and-transfer system will absorb 45% of any additional
inequality in lifetime earnings that is generated by skill-biased technological change or other
economic shifts that increase the returns to skill endowments.
We disaggregate the overall insurance and redistributive effects of the tax-and-transfer sys-
tem into components due to taxes, unemployment insurance, disability benefits, and social
assistance. We find that taxes are much more effective at redistributing lifetime income than
insuring lifetime earnings risk. We trace the smaller insurance effect of taxes to the fact that a
progressive tax on annual earnings cannot mitigate inequalities in lifetime earnings that arise
from differences in the number of years that individuals work during their lifetimes together
with the empirical reality that most of the inequality in lifetime earnings among individuals with
the same endowments is due to differences in working behavior. We find that social assistance
is the most important transfer program for both insurance and redistribution. Interestingly,
the wealth test for social assistance, which restricts benefits to individuals with limited assets,
reduces the insurance effect of social assistance. This reflects that, among individuals with
identical endowments of education and productive ability, the wealth test bites most often on
individuals with intermediate lifetime earnings. We also find that unemployment insurance and
disability benefits provide insurance, however, unemployment insurance redistributes lifetime
earnings whereas disability benefits are not redistributive.
In further analysis, we explore how the tax-and-transfer system insures three specific sources
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of lifetime earnings risk: job separation risk; job offer risk; and health risk. Our results show
that the tax-and-transfer system insures around 60% of the additional inequality in lifetime
earnings arising from an increase in risk, irrespective of the source of the risk. However, the
source of the risk to lifetime earnings affects the relative importance of unemployment insurance,
disability benefits, and social assistance in providing insurance. In particular, unemployment
insurance offers better insurance against earnings risk due to job separation risk than against
earnings risk due to job offer risk. Disability benefits, meanwhile, offer better insurance against
earnings risk due to the risk of bad health than against earnings risk due to job separation
or job offer risk, although the insurance that disability benefits provide against employment
risk is important. Social assistance is particularly effective at providing insurance against the
additional earnings risk that arises from a decrease in the job offer rate.
Our findings suggest two directions for policy reforms that may improve the lifetime in-
surance and redistributive effects of the tax-and-transfer system. First, the relatively small
insurance effect of progressive annual taxes that we find highlights a drawback of annual tax-
ation relative to multi-year or lifetime taxation. A progressive tax on lifetime earnings would
directly target differences in lifetime earnings between individuals with the same skill endow-
ments and, therefore, would be more effective at insuring lifetime earnings risk than an annual
tax. Second, our finding that the wealth test for social assistance reduces the lifetime insurance
effect of the tax-and-transfer system suggests that the insurance effect of social assistance may
be improved without increasing costs by switching to a lifetime wealth test that requires indi-
viduals with high wealth later in life to repay any social assistance they previously received.
Switching to a lifetime wealth test for social assistance may also improve the redistributive
effect of social assistance because most of the social assistance expenditures recouped under
the lifetime wealth test would come from individuals with high expected lifetime earnings.
Our interest in the inequality of lifetime income is based on studies that document substan-
tial inequities in lifetime earnings using administrative datasets (Bjo¨rklund, 1993, Kopczuk
et al., 2010, Aaberge and Mogstad, 2015, Bo¨nke et al., 2015, Guvenen et al., 2017), statistical
models (Bonhomme and Robin, 2009), or behavioral economic models (Bowlus and Robin, 2004,
Bowlus and Robin, 2012, Brewer et al., 2012). Our focus on the insurance and redistributive
effects of the tax-and-transfer system is motivated by a related literature that shows that both
risk and skill endowments contribute to the inequality of lifetime outcomes (e.g., Keane and
Wolpin, 1997, Flinn, 2002, Bowlus and Robin, 2004, Storesletten et al., 2004, Huggett et al.,
2011). The importance of risk in explaining disparities in lifetime earnings is consistent with
studies that show that individuals are subject to persistent earnings, health, and employment
shocks (e.g., Meghir and Pistaferri, 2011). The role of skill endowments in driving lifetime
earnings aligns with studies showing that education and non-cognitive skills are important
determinants of lifetime earnings (e.g., Bhuller et al., 2017, Nybom, 2017).
Several papers have looked at the reallocative effect of taxes and transfers on a lifetime basis
(e.g., Falkingham and Harding, 1996, Nelissen, 1998, Bjo¨rklund and Palme, 2002, Pettersson
and Pettersson, 2007, Ter Rele et al., 2007, Bovenberg et al., 2008, Bartels, 2012, Levell et al.,
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2017). This literature systematically finds that the reallocation of lifetime earnings through the
tax-and-transfer system partially offsets disparities in lifetime earnings. Levell et al. (2017),
for example, find that the inequality of lifetime income in the UK is about 25% lower than the
inequality of lifetime earnings. Levell et al. (2017) further show that in-work benefits and out-
of-work benefits are equally effective at reducing the inequality of lifetime income. Other papers
have taken a longitudinal perspective by looking at the dynamics of earnings and income at the
individual level. In this vein, Blundell et al. (2015) show that taxes and transfers moderate the
impact of transitory and permanent earnings shocks and Brewer and Shaw (2018) show that
the marginal tax rate that individuals face varies more within life cycle than across individuals.
However, in contrast to our analysis, the previous literature has not separately considered how
the tax-and-transfer system targets inequalities in lifetime earnings that are due to risk and
how taxes and transfers mitigate the inequality in lifetime earnings that is attributable to skill
endowments.
Our life-cycle model of labor supply and consumption is in the spirit of the models introduced
by Eckstein and Wolpin (1989), Keane and Wolpin (1997), and Imai and Keane (2004). Since
we require information about lifetime income, as well as lifetime earnings, we follow, e.g.,
Low et al. (2010), Hoynes and Luttmer (2011), Shaw (2014), Low and Pistaferri (2015), Haan
and Prowse (2015), and Blundell et al. (2016) by embedding a tax-and-transfer system into a
life-cycle model. This literature has considered individuals’ willingness to pay for particular
elements of the tax-and-transfer system and, in many cases, has differentiated willingness to
pay by education or other endowments. In contrast, we focus on the implications of taxes and
transfers for the inequality of lifetime income. In doing so, we make a connection to a literature
that links inequality to broader economic and socio-economic outcomes (see, e.g., Kelly, 2000,
Panizza, 2002, Cramer, 2003).
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our definitions of lifetime earnings
and lifetime income. In Section 3 we describe the life-cycle model that we use to derive lifetime
earnings and lifetime income. In Section 4 we discuss our parameter estimates and present the
results of a model validation exercise. In Section 5 we explore the insurance and redistributive
effects of the tax-and-transfer system and in Section 6 we show how the tax-and-transfer system
insures job separation risk, job offer risk, and health risk. In Section 7 we conclude by discussing
some implications of our results.
2 Earnings and income concepts
We start with our definitions of earnings and income. An individual’s annual earnings is
composed of annual labor earnings and annual interest income. Using i to index individuals
and t to denote age (measured in years), we have:
Earningsi,t = LaborEarningsi,t + InterestIncomei,t. (1)
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We define the individual’s annual income at age t to be equal to his annual earnings, defined
above, minus annual taxes plus the annual value of any government transfers:
Incomei,t = Earningsi,t − Taxesi,t + Transfersi,t. (2)
In other words, we use the term income to refer to after-tax-and-transfer earnings. Summing the
individual’s annual earnings over the life cycle yields the individual’s lifetime earnings. Likewise,
the individual’s lifetime income is obtained by summing the individual’s annual income over
the life cycle.
While the exact nature of tax and transfer programs varies from one country to another,
there are some broad similarities in how countries organize these programs. First, taxes are
generally based on annual income and are progressive on an annual basis. Second, transfer
programs typically include provisions for people experiencing bad health or disabilities, un-
employment insurance that provides temporary income replacement following a job loss, and
social assistance (i.e., welfare) that provides support to low income, wealth-poor individuals,
irrespective of their earnings history. Since these transfer programs support individuals when
they experience low income, they are also progressive on an annual basis. In our analysis, we
consider a tax-and-transfer system that includes progressive annual taxation along with un-
employment insurance, disability benefits and social assistance. To align with our data, the
tax-and-transfer system that we consider is based on the German system. Sections 2.1 and 2.2
provide further details.
2.1 Transfers
Transfers include unemployment insurance, disability benefits and social assistance.1
Unemployment insurance: An individual who enters unemployment from employment re-
ceives unemployment insurance for one year. Unemployment insurance is equal to sixty percent
of the individual’s after-tax labor earnings in the year before he entered unemployment.
Disability benefits: An individual in bad health may choose to enter disability-based re-
tirement, irrespective of his age. Once in disability-based retirement, an individual receives
disability benefits each year for the rest of his life. Disability benefits increase with earnings
prior to retirement, and include an experience credit of one year for each year that the individual
entered disability-based retirement before age 63 years.2
Social assistance: Social assistance guarantees every individual a minimum annual income.
In particular, if an individual’s combined annual income from labor earnings, interest income,
1The model also includes pension benefits for individuals in old-age retirement (see Appendix I).
2Specifically, an individual who enters retirement in bad health at age R receives an annual disability benefit
of:
α×WR ×DBPenaltyR × (ExperR + CreditR) ,
6
unemployment insurance and disability benefits is below the annual minimum income guaran-
teed by social assistance then the individual receives a social assistance transfer to increase his
annual income to the level of the annual minimum income guarantee. The annual minimum
income guarantee ranges from 8,400 euros per year if the individual has no assets to zero if the
individual is sufficiently wealthy. In more detail, the annual minimum income guaranteed by
social assistance is equal to:
max{8, 400−max {Ai,t − 10, 000− 500× (t− 20), 0} , 0},
where Ai,t denotes the individual’s assets at age t. Intuitively, the annual minimum income
guarantee is adjusted downwards by one euro for each euro of assets in excess of an age-specific
disregard. The age-specific disregard starts at 10,000 euros for an individual who is aged 20
years and increases by 500 euros with each year of age.
2.2 Taxes
Individuals face three annual taxes: a tax on annual labor earnings; a tax on annual interest
income; and a social security tax on annual labor earnings. Figure 1 shows the tax on annual
earnings and the associated average tax rate (assuming the individual has zero interest income).
Taxation is strongly progressive on an annual basis: the average tax rate varies from 18.2% for
individuals with labor earnings below 8,584 euros per year to 48% for individuals with labor
earnings of 70,000 euros per year. The tax on annual interest income is a flat rate tax of 25% on
interest income above an exemption and, therefore, is also progressive. Appendix II provides
further details about taxes.
where α is a parameter that controls the generosity of disability benefits, WR is the individual’s disability-
benefit-eligible annual earnings averaged over all years of employment prior to retirement, DBPenaltyR is a
penalty that reduces the individual’s annual disability benefit by 3.6% for each year that he retired before the
age of 63 years (up to a maximum reduction of 10.8%), ExperR denotes the individual’s experience at retirement
(i.e., the number of years that the individual was employed during his life), and CreditR is an experience credit
of one year for each year that the individual is entered disability-based retirement before the age of 63 years.
Only annual earnings below 72,374 euros are considered when calculating disability benefits.
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Figure 1: Annual taxes
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3 A model of lifetime income
Our analysis of the effect of taxes and transfers on the inequality of lifetime income requires
individual-level information about earnings, taxes, and transfers in each year of the life cy-
cle. Furthermore, to distinguish between the insurance and redistributive effects of the tax-
and-transfer system, we need to link the individual-level measures of earnings and income to
individuals’ skill endowments.
We derive the required information about earnings, income and skill endowments from a
dynamic life-cycle model. According to this model, in each year of the life cycle, each individual
chooses a labor supply state (l) and a level of consumption (c) to maximize the discounted
present value of his lifetime utility. The model includes three mutually exclusive labor supply
states: employment, unemployment, and retirement.3 Inequality in lifetime earnings may arise
from differences between individuals’ endowments or from different realizations of life-cycle
risks. The model includes three sources of lifetime earnings risk: employment risk (from job
separation risk and job offer risk), wage risk, and health risk. The model includes taxes and
transfers, which allows us to explore how the tax-and-transfer system insures lifetime earnings
risk and how it redistributes lifetime earnings. The model is described in Sections 3.1-3.8.
3.1 Endowments
Each individual is endowed with a level of education and a productive ability. Individual i’s
educational endowment, Educi ∈ {7, ..., 18}, is equal to his years of schooling.4 The individual’s
endowment of productive ability is given by ηi ∈ {η1, η2, η3}. Combining the eleven possible
3Employment corresponds to 40 hours of work per week; this is the median hours of work per week for
employees in the estimation sample. Unemployment includes individuals who are not willing to work at their
market wage and individuals who are willing to work at their market wage but do not receive a job offer.
4If the individual has fewer than 12 years of schooling then he enters the labor force at age 20 years.
Meanwhile, if the individual has 12 or more years of education then he enters the labor force at age Educi + 8
years.
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values of education with the three productive ability types gives a total of thirty-three distinct
endowment groups. As we explain below, an individual’s endowment of education and produc-
tive ability may affect the health risk, employment risk, and wage risk that he faces during his
lifetime. In this way, the model captures between-endowment inequality in lifetime earnings
and lifetime income.
We allow the endowments of education and productive ability to be interrelated, which may
occur if, e.g., individuals select into education based on their productive ability. We capture the
relationship between education and productive ability by allowing an individual’s probability
of being each of the three productive ability types to depend on his educational endowment.
Formally, we use E ∈ {1 “low education”, 2 “high education”} to distinguish low education,
defined as less than 12 years of education, and high education, defined as 12 or more years of
education. We then specify that an individual with education in category E ∈ {1, 2} has a
probability ρj,E of being endowed with productive ability ηj.
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3.2 Health risk
An individual’s health status is either good or bad. Individuals are in good health when they
first enter the labor market. Health then evolves stochastically over the life cycle: each year, an
individual in good health may be subject to a negative health shock, which transitions him into
bad health, while an individual in bad health may be subject to a positive health shock, which
transitions him into good health. The health transition probabilities depend on age, previous
health status, and education as follows:
Prob(GoodHealthi,t = 1) = Gt(HighEduci,GoodHealthi,t−1), (3)
where GoodHealthi,t is an indicator of the individual being in good health at age t, HighEduci
is an indicator of the individual having been endowed with at least twelve years of education
(high education) and Gt(·) is an age-dependent nonparametric function. See Section 4.3 for
further details.
3.3 Employment risk
Employment is feasible only if the individual receives a job offer in the current year. The
likelihood of receiving a job offer in the current year depends on the individual’s employment
status in the previous year. An individual who was employed in the previous year is subject to
an involuntary job separation with probability Φsi,t. An individual who was unemployed in the
previous year receives a job offer in the current year with probability Φoi,t while an individual
who was employed in the previous year receives a job offer in the current year provided that
they are not subject to an involuntary job separation. Retired individuals do not receive job
5We impose η1 > η2 > η3. This is for identification and is without loss of generality.
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offers. The involuntary job separation and job offer probabilities are given by:
Φki,t = Λ
(
φk1 + φ
k
2HighEduci + φ
k
3GoodHealthi,t + φ
k
41(t ≥ 50) + φk51(t ≥ 55) + φk61(t ≥ 60)
)
for k ∈ {s, o}, (4)
where Λ(·) denotes the logistic distribution function.
3.4 Retirement
An individual may retire only if he meets certain health- or age-based criteria. In particular, an
individual may retire only if he is in bad health (disability-based retirement) or if he is age 63
years or older (old-age retirement). Retirement is compulsory at age 65 years, and once retired
the individual remains retired until the end of the life cycle at age 78 years.
3.5 Wages and labor earnings
The log hourly wage is given by:
log(Wagei,t) = ψ1Educi + (ψ2Experi,t + ψ3Exper
2
i,t)× LowEduci +
(ψ4Experi,t + ψ5Exper
2
i,t)× HighEduci + ψ6GoodHealthi,t + ηi + κi,t + µi,t,(5)
where Experi,t denotes experience, defined as the number of years that the individual was em-
ployed during his life prior to the current year, LowEduci is an indicator of the individual having
been endowed with twelve or fewer years of education (low education), ηi is the individual’s
endowment of productive ability, κi,t is an autocorrelated wage shock, and µi,t ∼ N(0, σ2µ) is
wage measurement error that occurs independently over time. If the individual was employed
in the previous year then the autocorrelated wage shock evolves according to:
κi,t = δκi,t−1 + νi,t, (6)
where νi,t ∼ N(0, σ2ν) and is independent over time. Meanwhile, if the individual was in educa-
tion or unemployed in the previous year then κi,t is a draw from the steady state distribution of
the autocorrelated wage shock.6 Since employment entails 40 hours of work per week (see foot-
note 3), the annual labor earnings of employed individual i at age t are equal to Wagei,t×40×52.
3.6 Inter-temporal budget constraint
Assets, Ai,t are accumulated according to:
Ai,t = (1 + r)Ai,t−1 + LaborEarningsi,t − Taxesi,t + Transfersi,t − ci,t, (7)
6In the steady state κi,t ∼ N(0, σ2ν/(1− δ2)).
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where ci,t denotes the annual consumption of individual i at age t and r denotes the real interest
rate (assumed to be equal to 0.02). The term rAi,t−1 in (7) thus denotes individual i’s annual
interest income at age t.
3.7 Consumption and preferences
Individuals derive utility from consumption and leisure. The individual’s per-period utility
function is given by:
U(ci,t, li,t) =

α1
c1−γi,t
1− γ + 
1
i,t if li,t = retired,
α1
(ci,t(α2,1BadHealthi,t + α2,2GoodHealthi,t))
1−γ
1− γ + 
2
i,t if li,t = employed,
α1
(ci,t(α3,1BadHealthi,t + α3,2GoodHealthi,t))
1−γ
1− γ + 
3
i,t if li,t = unemployed.
(8)
For individuals in bad health, α2,1 denotes the share of consumption enjoyed if employed and
α3,1 denotes the share for consumption enjoyed if unemployed. The corresponding preference
parameters for individuals in good health are α2,2 and α3,2. γ ≡ 0.5 is the coefficient of relative
risk aversion. The preference shocks 1i,t, 
2
i,t and 
3
i,t are assumed to be type-1 extreme value
distributed and independent over labor supply states and over time. α1 is the weight given to
the systematic utility from consumption and leisure relative to the preference shocks.
3.8 Optimal behavior
The individual’s optimal consumption and labor supply choice at age t is given by:
{c∗i,t, l∗i,t} = argmax
{c,l}∈D(st)
{U(c, l, i,t) + βEt[Vt+1(si,t+1)|si,t, c, l]} . (9)
In the above, β ≡ 0.99 is the discount factor, D(st) is the set of choices that is available to
the individual at age t (the choice set is determined by involuntary job separations, job offers,
wealth and the age- and health-based restrictions on eligibility for retirement), Vt+1(si,t+1), is
the value function, i.e., the maximal expected discounted present value of lifetime utility at age
t+ 1, and si,t denotes the state variables. The state variables are as follows:
si,t ≡
{
Educi, ηi, t,Healthi,t,Experi,t, Ai,t, li,t−1,Wagei,t−1, νi,t, JSi,t, JOi,t, i,t
}
, (10)
where JSi,t and JOi,t are indicators of the individual receiving, respectively, an involuntary
job separation and a job offer at age t and i,t is a vector that contains the individual’s age-t
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preference shocks.7
4 Parameter estimates and model validation
We estimate the parameters of the life-cycle model using an unbalanced annual panel sample of
men from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).8 Our estimation sample contains 3,281
distinct individuals and a total of 20,843 individual-year observations from the years 2004–2016.
Appendix III describes the sample in more detail.
We estimate the model in two stages. First, we estimate the health transition probabilities
given by (3) and the parameters that determine the involuntary job separation probabilities
(φs1, ..., φ
s
6). Specifically, we compute the empirical probability of good health for each combina-
tion of age, previous health status, and educational category (high or low education). We then
smooth the age profiles of the empirical health probabilities using a Nadaraya-Watson kernel
regression (Nadaraya, 1964, Watson, 1964) with an epanechnikov kernel and the rule-of-thumb
bandwidth (Fan and Gijbels, 1996). The involuntary job separations are defined as transitions
into unemployment that are due to the end of a fixed-term contract, a dismissal or a firm clo-
sure, or that occur when the individual has bad health. In the second stage of the estimation,
we use a Maximum Likelihood procedure that targets the patterns of labor supply and wages
that we observe in the sample to estimate the parameters that appear in the utility function,
wage equation, and job offer probabilities. Appendix IV explains how we approximate the
value function, presents the likelihood function, and describes how we maximize the likelihood
function.
Sections 4.1–4.3 discuss the parameter estimates. Section 4.4 validates the estimated life-
cycle model by showing that the model’s predictions about the inequality in annual and lifetime
earnings are similar to the levels of inequality observed in a comparable administrative dataset
that was not used for estimation. Appendix IV.4 shows that the estimated model has good
in-sample fit.
4.1 Preferences and wages
Panel I of Table 1 reports our estimates of the parameters of the utility function. We estimate
the disutility of employment relative to retirement to be 44.1% of consumption for individuals
in good health and 35.4% for individuals in bad health. The estimated cost of unemployment
amounts to 26.3% of consumption for individuals in good health and 12.9% for individuals in bad
health. Panel II of Table 1 reports our estimates of the parameters of the wage equation. We find
7We operationalize the model by assuming that the individual chooses a level of saving, and thus a level of
consumption, from a finite set of alternatives. An employed individual chooses annual savings (in euros) from
the set {−5000, −2500, −1000, −500, 0, 500, 1000, 2500, 5000, 7500, 10000, 12500, 15000}. An unemployed
individual chooses annual savings (in euros) from the set {−15000, −12500, −10000, −7500, −5000, −2500,
−1000, −500, 0, 500, 1000, 2500, 5000}. A retired individual dis-saves the annuity value of his wealth.
8Wagner et al. (2007) and Socio-Economic Panel (2013) describe the SOEP.
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Table 1: Parameters of the utility function, wage equation and type probabilities
Estimate Standard error
Panel I: Utility function
α1 (Weight on utility from consumption and leisure) 1.794 0.0778
α2,1 − 1 (Disutility of employment, bad health) -0.441 0.0202
α2,2 − 1 (Disutility of employment, good health) -0.354 0.0210
α3,1 − 1 (Disutility of unemployment, bad health) -0.129 0.0255
α3,2 − 1 (Disutility of unemployment, good health) -0.263 0.0267
Panel II: Wage equation
η1 (Intercept for productive ability type 1) 1.936 0.0402
η2 (Intercept for productive ability type 2) 1.556 0.0402
η3 (Intercept for productive ability type 3) 1.124 0.0455
ψ1 (Educ/10) 0.683 0.0287
ψ2 (Exper/10, low education) 0.195 0.0145
ψ3 (Exper/10, high education) 0.320 0.0146
ψ4 (Exper
2/100, low education) -0.026 0.0031
ψ5 (Exper
2/100, high education) -0.047 0.0034
ψ6 (Good health) 0.015 0.0055
δ (Autocorrelation of wage shocks) 0.937 0.0034
σν (St.d. of wage shocks) 0.071 0.0014
σµ (St.d. of wage measurement error) 0.107 0.0008
Panel III: Productive ability type probabilities
ρ1,1 (Probability of productive ability type 1, low education) 0.437 0.0264
ρ2,1 (Probability of productive ability type 2, low education) 0.525 0.0256
ρ3,1 (Probability of productive ability type 3, low education) 0.038 0.0087
ρ1,2 (Probability of productive ability type 1, high education) 0.370 0.0244
ρ2,2 (Probability of productive ability type 2, high education) 0.499 0.0241
ρ3,2 (Probability of productive ability type 3, high education) 0.131 0.0140
Notes: ‘Educ’ is years of education and ‘Exper’ is years of experience. Standard errors were derived from
the Hessian of the log likelihood function at its maximum and using the delta method where required.
that wage shocks have a standard deviation of 0.071 and are highly persistent with 93.4% of a
wage shock carrying through to the next year. The standard deviation of the wage measurement
error is equal to 0.107. To aid in interpreting the remaining wage parameters, Figure 2 illustrates
estimated wage profiles (excluding wage shocks) for six of the thirty-three endowment groups
that we model. We find that wages vary strongly with both parts of individuals’ endowments
(education and productive ability). We also find positive returns to experience (with a minor
exception for individuals with close to the maximal level of experience). However, for the
purpose of interpreting our later results, it is important to note that the variation in wages
with experience within an endowment group is small and is much lower than the variation in
wages between different endowment groups. The effect of health status on wages is negligible
in magnitude (being in good health instead of bad health increases the wage by 1.5%). The
small effect of health on wages that we find is similar to the estimates of French (2005).
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Panel III of Table 1 shows that, for low educated individuals, we estimate that 43.7% are
endowed with high productive ability (type 1), 52.5% are endowed with medium productive
ability (type 2), and the remaining 3.8% are endowed with low productive ability (type 3). The
corresponding percentages for high educated individuals are 37.0%, 49.9%, and 13.1%.
Figure 2: Estimated wage profiles (excluding wage shocks)
(a) 11 years of education, good health
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(b) 14 years of education, good health
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Notes: Wage profiles were calculated using the parameter estimates shown in Panel II of Table 1 and
exclude wage shocks and wage measurement error.
4.2 Employment risk
Table 2 shows the estimated job offer and involuntary job separation probabilities. Individuals
in bad health face higher involuntary job separation and lower job offer probabilities than indi-
viduals in good health. Conditional on health status, offer probabilities are lower after age 50,
while separation probabilities decrease at age 50 and, then, increase after age 60. Conditional
on health status and age, the job offer and involuntary job separation probabilities decrease
with education, which implies that high educated individuals are both relatively unlikely to be
forced out of employment and face a relatively long expected wait before receiving a job offer.
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Table 2: Job offer and involuntary job separation probabilities
Age<50 50≤Age<55 55≤Age<60 Age≥60
Panel I: Job offer probabilities
Low education Bad health 0.188 0.113 0.140 0.109
(0.0152) (0.0133) (0.0148) (0.0161)
Good health 0.385 0.256 0.306 0.249
(0.0139) (0.0208) (0.0209) (0.0276)
High education Bad health 0.159 0.094 0.117 0.091
(0.0136) (0.0116) (0.0131) (0.0139)
Good health 0.338 0.219 0.264 0.213
(0.0120) (0.0188) (0.0193) (0.0246)
Panel II: Involuntary job separation probabilities
Low education Bad health 0.074 0.060 0.048 0.076
(0.0070) (0.0079) (0.0089) (0.0175)
Good health 0.019 0.015 0.012 0.019
(0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0053)
High education Bad health 0.041 0.033 0.026 0.042
(0.0046) (0.0049) (0.0054) (0.0108)
Good health 0.010 0.008 0.006 0.010
(0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0030)
Notes: Reported probabilities were obtained by evaluating (4) using the estimated parameter
values. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
4.3 Health risk
Figure 3 shows the estimated profiles of health risk over the life cycle. Education is an impor-
tant determinant of health. In particular, being highly educated decreases the likelihood of a
bad health shock and increases the likelihood of a good health shock. Reflecting a general dete-
rioration in health status over the life cycle, the probability of a bad health shock increases with
age and the probability of a good health shock decreases with age for high and low educated
individuals.
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Figure 3: Health risk
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Notes: Illustrated probabilities were obtained using the nonparametric estimation method described
in Section 4.
4.4 Validation
We validate the estimated model by comparing the inequality on labor earnings that is predicted
by the estimated model with the labor earnings inequality observed in a comparable sample that
was not used for estimation. In particular, we use the estimated model to simulate a sample
of life-cycle labor earnings profiles. We then compare the inequality of annual and lifetime
labor earnings in the simulated sample to Bo¨nke et al. (2015)’s calculations of the inequality of
annual and lifetime labor earnings based on a sample of lifetime labor earnings histories taken
from administrative social security records for Germany. The sample selection criteria used by
Bo¨nke et al. (2015) closely match the rules used for constructing our estimation sample (see
Appendix III): both samples exclude civil servants, self-employed individuals, East Germans,
and women. Our simulated sample and Bo¨nke et al. (2015)’s sample exclude individuals aged
60 years or above.9
Table 3 reports the results of our validation exercise. The first row of this table shows that
the inequality of annual labor earnings implied by the estimated model closely matches that
observed in the sample of administrative social security records (the Gini coefficients are equal
to 0.347 and 0.336, respectively). Of particular relevance for our later analysis, the second row
of Table 3 shows that the inequality of lifetime labor earnings predicted by the estimated model
also closely matches that observed in the sample of administrative social security records (the
Gini coefficients are equal to 0.218 and 0.212, respectively). It follows that the estimated model
replicates Bo¨nke et al. (2015)’s finding that the inequality of lifetime labor earnings is around
two-thirds of the inequality of annual labor earnings.
9Corneo (2015) reports further results from analysis of Bo¨nke et al. (2015)’s sample. For further comparisons
of the inequality of annual and lifetime earnings using administrative datasets of lifetime earnings see Kopczuk
et al. (2010) and Guvenen et al. (2017) for the US, Bjo¨rklund (1993) for Sweden, and Aaberge and Mogstad
(2015) for Norway.
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Table 3: Gini coefficients for annual and lifetime labor earnings
Sample simulated Sample of administrative Estimation sample
using estimated model social security records (from SOEP)
Annual labor earnings 0.347 0.336 0.316
Lifetime labor earnings 0.218 0.212 –
Notes: The simulated sample was constructed by using the estimated life-cycle model to simulate life-
cycle trajectories of labor supply, health, wages, earnings, income and wealth for 10,000 individuals.
Each individual in the simulated sample was endowed with a level of education and a productive ability.
The empirical distribution of education in the simulated sample was chosen to match that observed in
the estimation sample. The productive ability for each individual in the simulated sample was obtained
by drawing from the estimated distribution of productivity (see Panel III of Table 1). The sample of
administrative social security records was taken from the VSKT sample and is described in Bo¨nke et al.
(2015). The estimation sample from the SOEP is described in Appendix III. Gini coefficients for the
sample of administrative social security records are taken from Bo¨nke et al. (2015, Figure 1) and pertain
to the 1949 birth cohort. The Gini coefficient for annual labor earnings for the estimation sample was
calculated using re-weighting to replicate the (uniform) distribution of age in the other two samples.
Observations of individuals aged 60 years or older are excluded from all calculations.
We also note that the inequality of annual labor earnings in the estimation sample is similar
to the inequality of annual labor earnings in the simulated sample, which provides further
support for the in-sample fit of the estimated model (see Appendix IV.4). The inequality of
annual labor earnings in the estimation sample is also similar to the inequality of annual labor
earnings in the sample of administrative social security records; this finding provides empirical
support for the argument that the estimation sample and the sample of administrative social
security records are comparable.
5 Taxes, transfers & the inequality of lifetime income
We now turn to our first contribution, which is to use the estimated model to understand how
taxes and transfers insure lifetime earnings risk and how they redistribute lifetime earnings.
Before proceeding, we must consider the measurement of inequality. Our question requires us
to work with an inequality measure that is additively decomposable into within- and between-
endowment components. The rules out using the Gini coefficient (see Cowell and Flachaire,
2015). Instead, our primary analysis focuses on the Theil index, which is a special case of the
generalized entropy index. The Theil index for a sample of earnings (incomes) {yi}Ni=1 is given
by:
1
N
N∑
i=1
yi
y¯
ln
(
yi
y¯
)
, (11)
where y¯ denotes the sample mean of earnings (income).
We check the robustness of our results by reevaluating inequality using two alternative gen-
eralized entropy measures, namely the squared coefficient of variation and the mean logarithmic
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deviation. Compared to the Theil index, the squared coefficient of variation gives less weight
to inequality at the bottom of the distribution. Conversely, the mean logarithmic deviation
gives more weight than the Theil index to inequality at the bottom of the distribution. Despite
these differences, we show that our qualitative results hold irrespective of whether we measure
inequality using the Theil index, the squared coefficient of variation, or the mean logarithmic
deviation.10
5.1 Insurance and redistributive effects of taxes and transfers
Using the Theil index, we have the following decomposition of the inequality of lifetime income:
Inequality of
lifetime income
=
Within-endowment
inequality of lifetime income
+
Between-endowment
inequality of lifetime income
. (12)
The between-endowment inequality of lifetime income is a summary measure of the differences
in average lifetime income between individuals with different endowments of education and
productive ability. We define the redistributive effect of the tax-and-transfer system as the
difference between the between-endowment inequality of lifetime earnings and the between-
endowment inequality of lifetime income. The within-endowment inequality of lifetime income
reflects differences in lifetime income among individuals with the same endowment of education
and productive ability. The within-endowment inequality of lifetime income is, therefore, a
summary measure of the lifetime income consequences of risks that individuals cannot insure
themselves against. We assess the insurance function of taxes and transfers by looking at how
the tax-and-transfer system affects the within-endowment inequality of lifetime income.11
We quantify each component of (12) using a sample of life-cycle income trajectories simu-
lated from the estimated model. We repeat this exercise using earnings instead of income (the
notes to Table 3 describe how we use the estimated model to simulate earnings and income
trajectories). These calculations reveal the effect of taxes and transfers on the inequality of
lifetime income or, equivalently, the share of lifetime earnings inequality that is offset by taxes
and transfers. Throughout this exercise, we continue to focus on earnings and incomes of indi-
viduals younger than 60 years. In so doing, we abstract from the effects of old-age retirement
10The squared coefficient of variation and the mean logarithmic deviation are given by, respectively,∑N
i=1(yi − y¯)2/N
y¯2
and
1
N
N∑
i=1
ln
(
yi
y¯
)
.
11Hoynes and Luttmer (2011) and Shaw (2014) adopt similar definitions of insurance and redistribution in
the context of willingness to pay calculations. We note that the separation of the insurance and redistributive
effects of taxes and transfers is contingent on our assumptions about individuals’ knowledge of the earnings
process at the start of the life cycle. In particular, the within-endowment inequality of lifetime earnings can
only be interpreted as lifetime income risk if shocks are truly unforeseen. Likewise, the effect of taxes and
transfers on the between-endowment inequality of lifetime income can only be interpreted as redistribution if
individuals are fully informed about the expected consequences of their endowment at the beginning of the life
cycle.
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and pensions on income inequality.12
Table 4 summarizes our findings. Interestingly, although taxes and transfers are based on
annual earnings, the first column of Table 4 shows that the tax-and-transfer system is strongly
progressive on a lifetime basis. In particular, our calculations show that taxes and transfers
eliminate 49% of the inequality of lifetime income (see, e.g., Brewer et al., 2012, and Bengtsson
et al., 2016, for similar findings). This is an important result because: i) the inequality of
lifetime earnings is substantial (the inequality of lifetime earnings is around two-thirds as large
as the inequality of annual earnings, see Table 3); and ii) inequalities in lifetime earnings
represent cross-individual differences that people cannot mitigate by saving and borrowing.13
The second and third columns of Table 4 explore this result. We see that taxes and transfers
combined offset 54% of the within-endowment inequality of lifetime earnings, i.e., more than half
of the inequality in lifetime earnings that arises from differences between the lifetime earnings of
individuals with the same endowment is mitigated by taxes and transfers. Taxes and transfers
together also offset a similar percentage (45%) of the between-endowment inequality of lifetime
earnings. In other words, close to half of the inequality in lifetime earnings that arises from
education and productive ability is offset by taxes and transfers. Together these results show
that the tax-and-transfer system provides substantial insurance against lifetime earnings risk
and is strongly redistributive on a lifetime basis. Finally, we note that since around half of the
inequality in lifetime earnings is attributable to differences in individuals’ endowments (see the
first row of Table 4), the insurance and redistributive effects of taxes and transfers are similar
in absolute terms.14,15
12For a discussion about the distributional effects of pensions see, e.g., Conesa and Krueger (1999), Huggett
and Parra (2010), Coronado et al. (2011), and Feldstein and Liebman (2002).
13The model also implies that taxes and transfers reduce the Gini coefficient for annual income by 0.188.
This result aligns with previous studies, which have shown large mitigating effects of taxes and transfers on the
inequality of annual income (see, e.g., Piketty and Saez, 2007, Heathcote et al., 2010, Fuchs-Schuendeln et al.,
2010, Wang et al., 2012, DeBacker et al., 2013, and Bengtsson et al., 2016).
14Our estimate of the share of the inequality of lifetime earnings that is explained by endowments is similar
to that found by Huggett et al. (2011) (about 60%) and Storesletten et al. (2004) (about 50%). However, the
estimated share is lower than that reported in Keane and Wolpin (1997), who attribute 90% of the inequality
of lifetime earnings to endowments. Huggett et al. (2011) discuss how the different findings are related to the
specification of the endowments and the modeled sources of risk.
15Tables SWA.3 and SWA.4 in Appendix VI show that the results reported in Table 4 continue to hold if
inequality is measured using the squared coefficient of variation or the mean logarithmic deviation instead of
the Theil index.
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Table 4: Insurance and redistributive effects of the tax-and-transfer system
Inequality of lifetime earnings and lifetime income Ratio of between-
(100 × Theil index) endowment inequality
Total Within-endowment Between-endowment to total inequality
Earnings 7.75 3.38 4.37 0.56
(Labor earnings+
interest income)
Income 3.96 1.56 2.41 0.61
(Earnings−taxes+transfers)
Share of earnings inequality offset
by the tax-and-transfer system
0.49 0.54 0.45
Notes: All calculations are based on a sample of 10,000 income trajectories of individuals aged 20–59 years
inclusive simulated from the estimated model (the notes to Table 3 describe how we use the estimated model
to simulate income trajectories). The column headed ‘Total’ reports the inequality of lifetime earnings
and lifetime income. The column headed ‘Within-endowment’ (‘Between-endowment’) reports the within-
endowment (between-endowment) inequality of lifetime earnings and lifetime income. Taxes include a pro-
gressive tax on annual labor earnings, a progressive tax on annual interest income, and social security taxes for
health and unemployment benefits (see Appendix II). Transfers include unemployment insurance, disability
benefits, and social assistance (see Section 3.6).
We disaggregate the effects of the four programs that comprise the tax-and-transfer system
(namely taxes, unemployment insurance, disability benefits, and social assistance). This allows
us to understand which programs are most effective at reducing the inequality of lifetime income
and to identify the specific programs that account for the insurance and redistributive effects
of the tax-and-transfer system. A complication arises here because the effect of each program
depends on the order in which the programs are considered. We deal with this issue by using
the permutation-based method of Shorrocks (2013) to derive the contribution of each program
to income inequality in a way that is robust to ordering effects. According to this method, the
order-robust effect of a program on income inequality is obtained by calculating the program’s
effect on income inequality for each of the twenty-four (i.e., four factorial) possible orders of
the four programs and then averaging over the twenty-four possible program orders.
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Table 5: Shares of lifetime earnings inequality offset by taxes and transfer programs
Total
Within-endowment Between-endowment
(Insurance) (Redistribution)
Taxes 0.26 0.16 0.34
Unemployment insurance 0.03 0.03 0.02
Disability benefits 0.06 0.16 -0.01
Social assistance 0.14 0.19 0.10
Notes: All calculations are based on a sample of 10,000 income trajectories of individuals aged
20–59 years inclusive, simulated from the estimated model (the notes to Table 3 describe how
we use the estimated model to simulate income trajectories). The column headed ‘Total’ reports
the shares of the inequality of lifetime earnings that are offset by taxes, unemployment insurance,
disability benefits and social assistance. The column headed ‘Within-endowment’ (‘Between-
endowment’) reports the shares of the within-endowment (between-endowment) inequality of life-
time earnings that are offset by taxes, unemployment insurance, disability benefits and social
assistance. Shares are calculated from inequality as measured using the Theil index.
The first column of Table 5 shows that taxes reduce the inequality of lifetime income by 26%
while the three transfer programs combined (unemployment insurance, disability benefits, and
social assistance) reduce the inequality of lifetime income by 23% (giving the aforementioned
combined mitigating effect of the tax-and-transfer system on the inequality of lifetime income
of 49%). Among the three transfer programs, social assistance is by far the most important
program for reducing the inequality of lifetime income: social assistance offsets 14% of the
inequality of lifetime earnings while unemployment insurance and disability benefits offset 3%
and 6% of the inequality of lifetime earnings, respectively.16
The second and third columns of Table 5 report the effects of taxes and each of the three
transfer programs on the within- and between-endowment inequality of lifetime income. These
results, which we discuss in Sections 5.1.1-5.1.4, raise the following four questions about the
insurance and redistributive effects of taxes and transfers. Why are taxes more effective at
redistributing lifetime income than insuring lifetime earnings risk? Why do disability benefits
fail to redistribute lifetime earnings? What drives the redistributive effect of unemployment
insurance? What makes social assistance the most important transfer program for insuring
lifetime earnings risk and redistributing lifetime income? We address each question in turn.
5.1.1 Why are taxes more effective at redistributing lifetime income than insuring
lifetime earnings risk?
Table 5 shows that taxes reduce the between-endowment inequality of lifetime income by 34%.
In contrast, taxes reduce the within-endowment inequality of lifetime income by only 16%.
Thus, the insurance effect of taxes is around half of the size of the redistributive effect of
16Tables SWA.5 and SWA.6 in Appendix VI show that social assistance becomes more important as the
inequality measure gives more weight to the bottom of the income distribution. Despite this, we find that the
pattern of effects reported in Table 5 continues to hold when inequality is measured using the squared coefficient
of variation or the mean logarithmic deviation instead of the Theil index.
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taxes. Figure 4(a) explores the insurance effects of taxes in more detail by plotting the share of
lifetime earnings paid in tax against lifetime earnings for each of the six endowment groups as
shown in Figure 2. We find that within each endowment group the share of lifetime earnings
paid in tax increases modestly with lifetime earnings. Consider, e.g., individuals endowed with
fourteen years of education (high education) and high productive ability. Lifetime earnings for
individuals in this group range from 700,000 euros to 3,000,000 euros. Individuals with the
lowest lifetime earnings pay around 30% of their lifetime earnings in taxes while individuals
with the highest lifetime earnings pay 38% of their lifetime earnings in taxes. In other words,
while lifetime earnings increase more than 300% as we move from the lifetime poorest to the
lifetime richest individuals the share of lifetime earnings paid in tax increases only 8 percentage
points or 27%. A similar pattern holds for the other endowment groups.
The key to understanding why taxes have a limited insurance effect is to note that annual
taxes do not adjust for earnings in previous years of the individual’s life. It follows that
taxes based on annual earnings can not mitigate lifetime earnings differences that arise from
differences in the number of years that individuals work during their lives. To help understand
how differences in years worked during the life cycle contribute to our finding of a modest
insurance effect of taxation Figure 4(b) shows average number of years worked during the life
cycle against lifetime earnings for six of the thirty-three endowment groups that we model.
Within each endowment group the number of years worked during the life cycle increases
strongly with lifetime earnings. Aggregating over all endowment groups, we find that differences
in years worked during the life cycle explain 70.7% of the within-endowment inequality of
lifetime earnings (measured using the Theil index). This important role for years of work in
determining lifetime earnings strongly limits the potential for annual taxes to provide insurance
against lifetime earnings risk.
The inability of annual taxation to mitigate inequality in lifetime earnings due to differences
in years worked during the life-cycle represents a disadvantage of annual taxation relative to
multi-year or lifetime taxation, as proposed by Vickrey (1939, 1947). In contrast to annual
taxation, a progressive tax on lifetime labor earnings would directly target all sources of within-
endowment inequality of lifetime earnings and, therefore, would be more effective at insuring
lifetime earnings risk.
Annual earning taxes may, however, provide insurance against the remaining 29.3% of the
within-endowment inequality of lifetime earnings that is not due to differences in years worked
during the life cycle. Insurance may operate through two channels. First, if average earnings per
year of work increase with lifetime earnings among individuals with the same endowments then
a progressive annual tax will translate into a progressive tax on lifetime earnings. Second, if the
year-to-year variation in annual earnings across years of work increases with lifetime earnings for
individuals in the same endowment group then, due to the convexity of the progressive annual
tax function, annual taxes will again be progressive on a lifetime basis. Figures 4(c)–(d) show
that both channels operate in practice. The increase in average earnings per year of work with
lifetime earnings shown in Figure 4(c) reflects both the returns to experience and persistent wage
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shocks. Similarly, both the wage returns to experience and persistent wage shocks contribute
to the increase in the standard deviation of annual earnings with lifetime earnings shown in
Figure 4(d). Further analysis in Appendix V shows that most of the insurance effect of annual
taxes is driven by persistent wage shocks rather than returns to experience.
Figure 4: Insurance effects of taxation
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Notes: Smoothed Nadaraya-Watson kernel regressions estimated using the simulated sample described
in the notes to Table 4. ‘Low education’ refers eleven years of education and ‘high education’ refers to
fourteen years of education.
Next we explore the redistributive effects of annual taxation and explain why annual taxation
is highly effective at redistributing lifetime income between individuals with different endow-
ments. Figure 5(a) shows that the share of lifetime earnings paid in tax increases strongly with
the endowment-level average of lifetime earnings. Endowment-level average lifetime earnings
vary from 600,000 euros to 2,400,000 euros. Individuals in the lowest-earning endowment group
pay an average of 20% of their lifetime earnings in taxes while individuals in the highest earn-
ing endowment group earnings pay 38% of their lifetime earnings in taxes. A comparison of
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Figure 5: Redistributive effect of taxation
(a)
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
Sh
ar
e 
of
 lif
et
im
e 
ea
rn
ing
s
pa
id 
in 
ta
x
0 1,000,000 2,000,000 3,000,000
Endowment-level average lifetime earnings (euros)
(Expected lifetime earnings (euros))
(b)
0
10
20
30
40
Ye
ar
s w
or
ke
d 
du
rin
g 
life
tim
e
0 1,000,000 2,000,000 3,000,000
Endowment-level average lifetime earnings (euros)
(Expected lifetime earnings (euros))
(c)
0
40
,0
00
80
,0
00
Av
er
ag
e 
ea
rn
ing
s
of
 w
or
ke
rs
 (e
ur
os
)
0 1,000,000 2,000,000 3,000,000
Endowment-level average lifetime earnings (euros)
(Expected lifetime earnings (euros))
(d)
0
8,
00
0
15
,0
00
St
an
da
rd
 d
ev
iat
ion
 o
f a
nn
ua
l
ea
rn
ing
s o
f w
or
ke
rs
 (e
ur
os
)
0 1,000,000 2,000,000 3,000,000
Endowment-level average lifetime earnings (euros)
(Expected lifetime earnings (euros))
Notes: Smoothed Nadaraya-Watson kernel regressions estimated using the simulated sample described
in the notes to Table 4. All dependent variables are endowment-level averages.
Figure 4(a) and Figure 5(a) reveals that the relationship between lifetime taxation and lifetime
earnings is much stronger between endowment groups than it is within endowment groups.
Three factors contribute to the large redistributive effect of annual taxes. First, annual taxes
cannot address the between-endowment inequality in lifetime earnings that is due to differences
across individuals in years of work, however, as shown in Figure 5(b), we find that essentially
none of the between-endowment inequality in lifetime earnings is due to between-individual
differences in years worked.17 Second, a progressive annual tax will be more redistributive the
more strongly endowment-level average earnings of workers increases with the endowment-level
average of lifetime earnings. The high wage returns to education and productive ability that we
find lead endowment-level average earnings of workers to increase strongly with the endowment-
level average of lifetime earnings (see Figure 5(c)). Third, due to the convexity of progressive
annual taxes, the redistributive effect of annual taxes increases with the year-to-year variability
in worker’s earnings. Figure 5(d) shows that workers with higher expected lifetime earnings
17Differences between endowment groups in the average number of years that individuals work during their
lifetimes explains only 0.035% of the the between-endowment inequality in lifetime earnings.
24
have more variability in their earnings.18
5.1.2 Why do disability benefits fail to redistribute lifetime earnings?
Table 5 shows that disability benefits do not redistribute lifetime earnings between groups
of individuals with different endowments of education and productive ability. Quantitatively,
disability benefits increase the between-endowment inequality of lifetime income by one per-
centage point, which is a small effect compared to the 45% reduction in the between-endowment
inequality of lifetime income achieved by the composite tax-and-transfer system.
Figure 6: Redistributive effect of disability benefits
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Notes: Smoothed Nadaraya-Watson kernel regressions estimated using the simulated sample described
in the notes to Table 4. The dependent variable in panel (a) is the endowment-level average of an
individual-year-level indicator of eligibility for disability benefits (an individual is eligible for disability
benefits in a given year if he is in bad health in that year). The dependent variable in panel (b) is the
endowment-level average of an individual-year-level indicator of disability benefit receipt (an individual
is defined to receive disability benefits in a given year if he has non-zero disability benefit income in
that year).
At first sight, the absence of a redistributive effect for disability benefits is counterintuitive:
given that education increases both expected lifetime earnings and the likelihood of being in
good health (thereby decreasing the likelihood of eligibility for disability benefits), we expect
disability benefits to reduce the inequality in lifetime income between individuals with high
education (and therefore high expected lifetime earnings) and individuals with low education
(and therefore low expected lifetime earnings). The reason that disability benefits fail to re-
distribute lifetime earnings is that, while the rate of eligibility for disability benefits decreases
with expected lifetime earnings, the rate of disability benefit receipt is U-shaped (see Figure 6).
The high take-up rate of disability benefits for individuals with low expected lifetime earnings
reflects that the option value of future employment is relatively low for individuals with un-
productive endowments. The increase in the take up rate with expected lifetime earnings for
18Given that the year-to-year variability of earnings increases with expected lifetime earnings, an annual tax
may be more redistributive than an equally progressive tax on lifetime earnings.
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individuals who expect to earn at least 1,000,000 euros in their lifetimes reflects a program
interaction between social assistance and disability benefits. Recall, the value of the disabil-
ity benefits increases with lifetime earnings while social assistance ensures individuals have a
minimum annual income that does not depend on past earnings. It follows that as expected
lifetime earnings increase so does the fraction of individuals who prefer disability benefits to
social assistance. The wealth test for social assistance also contributes to the increase in dis-
ability benefit take-up with expected lifetime earnings because wealth tends to increase with
expected lifetime earnings.
5.1.3 What drives the redistributive effect of unemployment insurance?
Unemployment insurance is designed to provide short-term insurance against job loss, and is
not generally considered to be a redistributive program. However, we find that unemployment
insurance is mildly redistributive. Specifically, Table 5 shows that unemployment insurance
eliminates two percent of the between-endowment inequality of lifetime income. This result is
driven by the decrease in the risk of a job separation with education and the increase in health
status with education, which further reduces the job separation risk (see Table 2). This pattern
of employment risk leads unemployment insurance receipt to be concentrated among individuals
with low expected lifetime earnings. In particular, in our simulated sample, individuals with
expected lifetime earnings below 500,000 euros receive unemployment insurance for an average
of 2.6 years between age 20 years and age 60 years, while individuals with expected lifetime
earnings above 1,500,000 euros receive unemployment insurance for an average of 0.6 years
during the same time period.
5.1.4 What makes social assistance the most important transfer program for in-
surance and redistribution?
Among the three transfer programs, social assistance has by far the largest effect on the inequal-
ity of lifetime income: Table 5 shows that social assistance eliminates 14% of the inequality of
lifetime income, while unemployment insurance and disability benefits eliminate, respectively,
3% and 6% of the inequality of lifetime income. Table 5 further shows that social assistance
is important for insuring lifetime earnings risk and redistributing lifetime income. In particu-
lar, social assistance offsets 19% of the within-endowment inequality of lifetime earnings and
mitigates 10% of the between-endowment inequality of lifetime earnings. The insurance and
redistributive effects of social assistance exceed those of unemployment insurance and disability
benefits.
To understand why social assistance has large insurance and redistributive effects we must
consider the rules that are used to calculate social assistance. As explained in Section 2.1, social
assistance makes up the difference between an individual’s income from all other sources and
the minimum income guarantee. The minimum income guarantee decreases with wealth and
is zero for individuals who are sufficiently wealthy. We explore the effects of social assistance
by separating the income-based determinants of social assistance from the effect of the wealth-
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based adjustment to the minimum income guarantee. In particular, we learn about the income-
based determinants of social assistance by studying the ‘social assistance income gap’, defined
as the difference between the non-wealth-adjusted minimum income guarantee and individual’s
annual income before social assistance. We parse out the effect of the wealth-based social
assistance rules by studying how often the wealth-based adjustment to the minimum income
guarantee reduces the social assistance received by income-eligible individuals to zero, i.e., we
study the fraction of income-eligible individuals who fail the social assistance wealth test.
Figure 7: Insurance effect of social assistance
(a) Income effect
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Notes: Smoothed Nadaraya-Watson kernel regressions estimated using the simulated sample described
in the notes to Table 4. The dependent variable in the regressions illustrated in panel (a) is an
individual-year-level variable that is equal to the difference between the non-wealth-adjusted annual
minimum income guarantee and an individual’s annual income before social assistance (this variable is
censored at zero and thus is equal to zero if the individual’s annual income before social assistance is
greater than the non-wealth-adjusted annual minimum income guarantee). The dependent variable in
the regressions illustrated in panel (b) is an individual-year-level indicator for an individual’s annual
social assistance income being reduced to zero by the wealth-based adjustment to the annual minimum
income guarantee (these regression are estimated using only individual-year observations where the
individual was eligible for social assistance on the basis of income). ‘Low education’ refers to eleven
years of education and ‘high education’ refers to fourteen years of education.
We first consider the insurance effect of social assistance. We focus on the same six endow-
ment groups as considered in Figure 2. Figure 7(a) shows that within each endowment group
the social assistance income gap decreases rapidly with lifetime earnings, indicating that the
income-based social assistance rules make social assistance an effective insurance device. This
occurs because the income-based rules for social assistance focus the benefit on individuals with
low annual income from other sources and, among individuals with the same endowment, those
with low lifetime earnings experience many years with low income, i.e., low income status is
highly persistent.
Figure 7(b) shows the fraction of income-eligible individuals who fail the social assistance
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wealth test against lifetime income for six of the thirty-three endowment groups that we model.
Overall, within each endowment group, there is a hump-shaped pattern with individuals with
highest and lowest lifetime earnings being the least likely to fail the wealth test and individuals
with intermediate lifetime earnings failing the wealth test most often. Individuals with high
lifetime earnings fail the wealth test relatively infrequently because individuals with relatively
high lifetime earnings typically have annual incomes (excluding social assistance) that are below
the non-wealth adjusted minimum income guarantee only when they are young. These young
individuals generally have low wealth and thus actually receive social assistance. Meanwhile
individuals with intermediate lifetime earnings typically have annual incomes (excluding social
assistance) that are below the non-wealth adjusted minimum income guarantee at several differ-
ence times during the life cycle, including at older ages when they have accumulated sufficient
wealth to make themselves ineligible for social assistance. Individuals with the lowest lifetime
earnings rarely work and therefore are unlikely to have accumulated sufficient wealth to make
them ineligible for social assistance.
From Figure 7(b) it is unclear whether the wealth-testing of social assistance increase or
decreases the insurance effect of social assistance. Further calculations show that eliminating the
wealth-based adjustment to social assistance benefits increases the share of within-endowment
inequality in lifetime earnings that is offset by social assistance from 19% (see Table 5) to 20%,
i.e., a 5% increase in effectiveness. We note that, although wealth-testing social assistance
reduces the insurance effect of social assistance, wealth-testing reduces the financial cost of
providing social assistance. This raises the question of whether there is an alternative way
of wealth-testing social assistance that limits the costs of providing social assistance without
attenuating the insurance effects of the program. We argue that the insurance effect of social
assistance may be improved without additional costs by switching to a lifetime wealth test
that requires individuals with high wealth later in life to repay any social assistance received
when younger. Since wealth reflect strong prior earnings, the lifetime wealth test would recoup
social assistance expenditures from individuals with high lifetime earnings, thereby improving
the insurance effect of social assistance.
We now turn to the redistributive effect of social assistance. We again separate the effects
of the income-based and wealth-based determinants of social assistance. Figure 8(a) shows
that the social assistance income gap is modest, only around 500 euros per person per year, for
individuals with expected lifetime earnings above 1,000,000 euros. However, the social assis-
tance income gap increases sharply as expected lifetime earnings decrease below this level, and
reaches over 2,000 euros per person per year for individuals with the lowest level of expected
lifetime earnings. This pattern implies that the income-based rules for social assistance are
strongly redistributive. Intuitively, social assistance targets the incomes of individuals with
low expected lifetime incomes because the income-based rules for social assistance focus the
benefit on individuals with low annual income (before social assistance) and individuals with
low expected lifetime earnings tend to experience many years of low income during their lives.
Figure 8(b) shows an upwards sloping relationship between ineligibility for social assistance on
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the basis of wealth and expected lifetime earnings, showing that the wealth-testing of social
assistance increases the redistributive effect of the program. Quantitatively, we find that elim-
inating the wealth test for social assistance reduces the redistributive effect of social assistance
by 1%. While the wealth test for social assistance makes the program more redistributive,
switching to a lifetime wealth test may increase the redistributive effect of this program be-
cause most of the social assistance expenditures recouped under the lifetime wealth test would
come from individuals in endowment groups with high expected lifetime earnings.
Figure 8: Redistributive effect of social assistance
(a) Income effect
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Notes: Smoothed Nadaraya-Watson kernel regressions estimated using the simulated sample described
in the notes to Table 4. Dependent variables are endowment-level averages of the individual-year-level
variables defined in the notes to Figure 7.
6 Insurance of lifetime employment and health risks
Finally, we show how employment risk and health risk affect the inequality of lifetime earnings
and we explore how taxes and transfer programs provide insurance against these risks. This
analysis leverages the estimated life-cycle model in two respects. First, we use the model to learn
how specific changes in employment and health risks affect the inequality of lifetime earnings.
This contrasts with our earlier decomposition-based analysis, which pooled together all sources
of lifetime earnings risk. Second, we use the model to study how taxes and transfer programs
insure employment and health risks while accounting for the self-insurance that individuals
obtain by optimally adjusting their labor supply and savings behavior in response to changes
in the risks that they face.
We consider four risk environments: a baseline environment and three counterfactual risk
environments in which individuals face an increased risk of adverse employment or health events.
In the baseline environment, health shocks, job offers, and involuntary job separations occur
at the rates given by the estimated life-cycle model (see Figure 3 and Table 2). In the first
counterfactual environment employed individuals face an increased risk of being subject to an
involuntary job separation, in the second counterfactual environment unemployed individuals
face a decreased risk of receiving a job offer, and in the third counterfactual environment
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individuals face an increased risk of bad health shocks. In particular, each counterfactual
environment is defined by scaling the relevant risk probability to make the employment rate one
percentage point lower than the baseline rate, e.g., in the first counterfactual environment the
involuntary job separation probability is scaled up to make the employment rate one percentage
point lower than the baseline rate. The three counterfactual environments, therefore, feature
different employment and health risks but the same employment rate.
Table 6: Employment risk and health risk environments
Baseline
Increased job Decreased job Increased risk of
separation risk offer rate bad health shocks
Employment rate 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.82
Average unemployment spells per person 1.16 1.24 0.85 1.16
Average unemployment spell duration (years) 3.09 3.10 3.57 3.14
Rate of bad health 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.20
Average bad health spells per person 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.29
Average bad health spell duration (years) 6.28 6.28 6.28 6.33
Notes: Calculations for all three risk environments are based on samples of 10,000 life-cycle tra-
jectories of individuals aged 20–59 years inclusive, simulated from the estimated model (the notes
to Table 3 describe how we use the estimated model to simulate employment trajectories). Results
for the baseline environment were calculated using the estimated parameter values. Results for
the environment with increased job separation risk were obtained by proportionally increasing the
estimated job separation probabilities to reduce the employment rate by one percentage point from
the baseline rate. Results for the environment with the decreased job offer rate were obtained by
proportionally decreasing the estimated job offer probabilities to reduce the employment rate by
one percentage point from the baseline rate. Results for the environment with the increased risk
of bad health shocks were obtained by proportionally increasing the estimated probability of a
transition from good to bad health status to reduce the employment rate by one percentage point
from the baseline rate.
Table 6 summarizes employment and health outcomes in the four risk environments. The
employment rate is 83% in the baseline environment and, by construction, 82% in each of
the counterfactual environments. The increase in job separation risk increases the average
number of unemployment spells per person from 1.16 to 1.24 but hardly affects the average
unemployment spell duration. In contrast, the decrease in job offer rate increases the average
unemployment spell duration from 3.09 years to 3.57 years; at the same time, the average
number of unemployment spells per person decreases to 0.85, reflecting compositional change
in the pool of employed individuals. The increased risk of bad health shocks increases the rate
of bad health from 16% to 20% and increases the average number of bad health spells per
person from 1.01 to 1.29.
The first row of Table 7 shows that the increase in job separation risk, the decrease in the
job offer rate, and the increase in the risk of bad health shocks cause sizable increases in the
within-endowment inequality of lifetime earnings. Relative to the baseline environment, the
within-endowment inequality of lifetime earnings increases by around 5% in response to the
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Table 7: Insurance of employment risk and health risk
∆ Within-endowment inequality
Within-endowment Increased job Decreased job Increased risk of
inequality in baseline separation risk offer rate bad health shocks
Lifetime earnings 3.38 0.18
[5%]
0.64
[19%]
0.39
[12%]
(Labor earnings+
interest income)
Lifetime income 1.56 0.06
[4%]
0.28
[18%]
0.14
[9%]
(Earnings−taxes+transfers)
Share of extra within-
endowment inequality offset
by the tax-and-transfer
system
0.66 0.56 0.65
Notes: Inequality is measured using (100×) the Theil index. ‘∆ Within-endowment inequality’
is the increase in within-endowment inequality from the baseline environment. The percentage
increases in inequality from the baseline are shown in brackets. the within-endowment inequality
of lifetime earnings increases by around Also see notes to Table 6.
increase in job separation risk and increases by 19% in response to the decrease in the job offer
rate. The increase in the risk of bad health shocks, meanwhile, increases the within-endowment
inequality of lifetime earnings by 12%. The relatively large increase in inequality associated with
the decrease in the job offer rate reflects that this risk increase extends unemployment durations,
thereby depressing the lifetime earnings of individuals at the bottom of the distribution of
lifetime earnings.
Table 7 also shows that 56–66% of the increase in lifetime earnings risk that arises from
increased employment risk is mitigated by the tax-and-transfer system while the remaining 44–
33% of the extra lifetime earnings risk passes through into inequality in lifetime income. The
tax-and-transfer system therefore insures the majority of the additional earnings risk associated
with increases in employment risk. The tax-and-transfer system provides a similar level of
insurance against health shocks, specifically 65% of the extra within-endowment inequality of
lifetime earnings associated with an increase in the risk of bad health shocks is mitigated by
the tax-and-transfer system.19
Table 8 explores the insurance effect of the tax-and-transfer system in more detail by sepa-
rating the effects of taxes and transfers (unemployment insurance, disability benefits, and social
19Tables SWA.7 and SWA.8 in Appendix VI explore the robustness of the results in Table 7 to measuring
inequality using the squared coefficient of variation and the mean logarithmic deviation instead of the Theil
index. Irrespective of the measure of inequality, the tax-and-transfer system offers essentially equal amounts
of insurance against the two different employment risks. The amount of insurance increases as we move to
inequality measures that give more weight to the bottom of the income distribution, reflecting that the tax-
and-transfer system is relatively effective at mitigating increases in the inequality of lifetime earnings among
the lifetime poor.
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Table 8: Shares of additional within-endowment lifetime earnings inequality
offset by taxes and transfer programs
Increased job Decreased job Increased risk of
separation risk offer rate bad health shocks
Taxes 0.07 0.11 0.08
Unemployment insurance 0.06 -0.01 0.02
Disability benefits 0.23 0.13 0.36
Social assistance 0.30 0.33 0.19
Notes: Inequality is measured using the Theil index. Also see notes to Table 6.
assistance). We find that transfers rather than taxes are primarily responsible for insurance
that the tax-and-transfer system provides against employment and health shocks: irrespec-
tive of the source of the increase in inequality, taxes mitigate 7–11% of the increase in the
within-endowment inequality of lifetime earnings. Meanwhile, transfer programs offset around
half of the extra within-endowment inequality in lifetime earnings. Interestingly, the relative
importance of each of the three transfer programs–unemployment insurance, disability benefits
and social assistance–depends on the source of the additional within-endowment inequality of
lifetime earnings.
In more detail, unemployment insurance mitigates 6% of the increase in the within-endowment
inequality of lifetime earnings that arises from an increase in job separation risk. In contrast
this program has a small negative effect (-1%) on the extra within-endowment inequality that
arises from a decrease in the job offer rate. This pattern reflects that, since unemployment
insurance provides income replacement only during the first year of an unemployment spell,
this program is well placed to mitigate the effects of job separation risk, which affects the fre-
quency but not the duration of unemployment. Since unemployment insurance does not provide
long-term income replacement, it is not effective at mitigating the effects of lifetime earnings
risk that is driven by a decrease in the job offer rate, which increases the average duration of
unemployment spells.
Disability benefits mitigate 36% of the increase in the within-endowment inequality of life-
time earnings that arises from an increase in the risk of bad health shocks. This large effect
shows the importance of disability benefits for insuring lifetime health risk. Two factors pre-
vent disability benefits from being even more effective at insuring lifetime health risk. First,
the amount of insurance that disability benefits provide is limited because disability benefits
only partially replace lost earnings. Second, although bad health status qualifies an individual
for disability benefits, some eligible individuals do not take up the benefits because doing so
precludes future employment. We also note that disability benefits are more effective at in-
suring health risk than employment risk, however, the insurance against employment risk is
important: disability benefits mitigate 13–23% of the within-endowment increase in inequality
that arises from increased employment risk. This pattern reflects that some bad-health indi-
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viduals who experience a job separation or who are unemployed and without a job offer choose
to claim disability benefits. Since individuals with long periods of unemployment in their work
history are not entitled to generous disability benefits, disability benefits are less effective at
insuring earnings risk that arises from a decrease in the job offer rate than they are at insuring
earnings risk that is generated by the increase in job separation risk.
Social assistance is an effective program for providing insurance against job separation risk,
job offer risk, and health risk. However, social assistance is particularly effective at providing
insurance against earnings risk that arises from a decrease in the job offer rate. This reflects
that social assistance is a permanent transfer and thus is effective at mitigating the lifetime
income consequences of the increase in unemployment durations that arises from a decrease in
the job offer rate.20
7 Conclusion
The tax-and-transfer system may redistribute lifetime earnings between individuals with differ-
ent skill endowments, thereby counteracting the inequality in lifetime earnings that is due to
individual differences that originate early in life. The tax-and-transfer system may also mitigate
differences in lifetime earnings that arise from unpredictable events that individuals experience
during their lifetimes, such as job loss, difficulty in finding employment, or changes in health
status. That is, taxes and transfers may provide individuals with insurance against lifetime
earnings risk. In this paper, we have shown how the tax-and-transfer system insures lifetime
earnings risk and how it redistributes lifetime earnings between individuals with different skill
endowments.
Our results on redistribution show that the tax-and-transfer system absorbs around half
of the inequality in lifetime earnings due to differences in skill endowments. This finding in
relevant to discussions of the inequality-increasing effects of skill-biased technological change
(e.g., Bekman et al., 1998, Autor et al., 2003). In particular, to the degree that skill-biased
technological change increases earnings inequality by raising the returns to endowments, our
results suggest that only half of the extra inequality in lifetime earnings associated with skill-
biased technological change will pass through into inequality in lifetime income. We also find
that the tax-and-transfer system offers considerable insurance against lifetime earnings risk.
In particular, the tax-and-transfer system insures around 60% of the inequality in lifetime
earnings that can be attributed to employment and health shocks. The insurance function of
the tax-and-transfer system operates mainly through social assistance and disability benefits.
Our findings suggest two possible reforms to the tax-and-transfer system that may improve
its lifetime properties. First, the lifetime insurance effect of the tax-and-transfer system may
be increased by switching to a system of lifetime taxation. While progressive annual taxation
20Tables SWA.9 and SWA.10 in Appendix VI show that the results in Table 8 to are qualitatively robust to
measuring inequality using the squared coefficient of variation and the mean logarithmic deviation instead of
the Theil index.
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offers limited insurances against lifetime earnings risk, a progressive tax on lifetime earnings,
as discussed by Vickrey (1939, 1947), would directly target unexpected differences in lifetime
earnings and, therefore, would provide individuals with more insurance against lifetime earn-
ings risk. Second, the lifetime insurance and redistributive effects of social assistance may be
increased, without additional financial costs, by replacing the annual wealth test with a lifetime
wealth test that requires individuals with high wealth later in life to repay any social assistance
received when younger.
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Appendix I : Pensions
Individuals in old-age retirement (i.e., individuals who retired at age 63 or above in good health)
receive pension benefits each year for the remainder of their lives. The annual pension benefit
received by an individual who entered old-age retirement at age R is given by:
Pension = α×WR × PenPenaltyR × ExperR, (13)
where α is a parameter that controls the generosity of pension benefits, WR is the individual’s
annual pension-benefit-eligible labor earnings averaged over all years of employment prior to
retirement, ExperR is the individual’s experience (in years) at retirement, and PenPenaltyR is
a penalty that reduces the individual’s annual pension by 3.6% for each year that he retired
before the age of 65 years. Only annual labor earnings below 72,374 euros are considered when
calculating pension benefits. The taxation of pension benefits is described in Appendix II.
Appendix II : Taxes
Annual labor earnings above an exemption threshold of 8,652 euros are subject to a labor earn-
ings tax. The labor earnings tax function is a smooth progressive function of taxable annual
labor earnings with a marginal tax rate that ranges from 15% to 42%. Annual interest income
above an exemption threshold of 801 euros is taxed at a constant marginal rate of 25%. Indi-
viduals pay a further tax (Solidaritaetszuschlag) of 5.5% of their tax liability on labor earnings
and interest income. Individuals also pay a social security tax for health, unemployment and
pension benefits. The social security tax is a flat rate tax of 18.2% (7.35% for health benefits,
1.5% for unemployment benefits, and 9.35% for pension benefits) on labor earnings below a
cap of 74,400 euros per year.
Fifty percent of annual pension benefit income in excess of an exemption threshold of 17,306
euros is taxed on the same basis as taxable labor earnings. We account for the taxation of
pension benefits, along with all other taxes, when estimating the model and when using the
estimated model to simulate datasets. However, because we focus on individuals younger than
age 60 years, the taxation of pension benefits does not affect the decompositions presented in
Sections 5 and 6.
Appendix III : Estimation sample
The estimation sample is an unbalanced annual panel sample of men from years 2004–2016 of
German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The estimation sample excludes individuals younger
than 20 years or older than 65 years, individuals in education, East Germans, the self-employed
and civil servants. Table SWA.1 provides definitions and descriptive statistics for the variables
used in the analysis.
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Table SWA.1: Descriptive statistics for the SOEP sample
Variable Observations Mean Minimum Maximum
Age (years) 20,843 45.760 20 64
Employed 20,843 0.874 0 1
Unemployed 20,843 0.074 0 1
Retired (disability-based or old-age retirement) 20,843 0.052 0 1
Education (years) 20,843 12.362 7 18
Health 20,843 0.832 0 1
Involuntary job separation 20,843 0.022 0 1
Experience (years) 20,843 22.474 0 49
Wage (euros per hour) 18,225 19.993 8.5 47.01
Wealth (euros) 20,843 56,978 0 660,000
Notes: Individuals working at least 20 hours per week are classified as employed. The small
number of men working fewer than 20 hours per work are classified as unemployed. Median
hours of work per week for individuals who are employed is 40. Years of education includes
time spent in formal education and occupational training. Health is an indicator of good health,
defined as neither being officially disabled nor assessing own health as “bad” or “very bad”.
Involuntary job separations are defined as transitions to unemployment due to the end of a fixed
term contract, dismissal or firm closure and transitions into unemployment when the individual
has bad health. Experience is defined as years spent in employment. Wage is the pre-tax
hourly wage (wages are only observed for individuals in employment). Wealth is calculated from
information about the net value of financial and real assets that were collected in the 2007 SOEP
survey and information about savings that was collected in every SOEP survey. Wealth is left
censored at zero and right censored at 660,000 euros. Wages and wealth are expressed in year
2016 prices.
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Appendix IV: Estimation
In Appendix IV.1 we explain how we approximate the value function, in Appendix IV.2 we
present the likelihood function, and in Appendix IV.3 we describe how we maximize the likeli-
hood function.
Appendix IV.1: Value function approximation
We derive analytic expressions for the value function that appears in (9), starting from the
following choice-specific value functions:
Vt(ci,t, li,t, si,t) = U(ci,t, li,t) + βEt[Vt+1(si,t+1)|si,t, ci,t, li,t] for t = 20, ..., T, (14)
where ET [VT+1(si,T+1)|si,T , ci,T , li,T ] = 0 (since period T is the last period of the individual’s life).
Let xi,t denote the age-t state variables excluding the preference shocks. We decompose the
choice-specific value functions into a systematic component and a random component, which
corresponds to the preference shock:
Vt(ci,t, li,t, si,t) = V t(ci,t, li,t,xi,t) + i,t(ci,t, li,t) for t = 20, ..., T. (15)
Given the distributional assumptions about preference shocks (see Section 3.7), we have the
following analytic expression for the expected age t+ 1 value function:
Et[Vt+1(si,t+1)|si,t, ci,t, li,t] =
∑
xt+1
log
 ∑
{c,l}∈D(xt+1)
exp(V t+1(c, l,xi,t+1))
×
q(xt+1|xt, ci,t, li,t) for t = 20, ..., T − 1, (16)
where q(xt+1|xt, ci,t, li,t) denotes the joint probability mass function of the state variables xi,t+1
conditional on the state variables xi,t and conditional on the individual’s consumption and
labor supply outcome at age t (since the choice set does not depend on preference shocks,
D(xt) ≡ D(st)).
We approximate the value function using recursive interpolation, working backwards from
age T (see Keane and Wolpin, 1994). In more detail, for each age, we evaluate the value
function at set of grid points. The evaluation grid includes all possible values of health, labor
supply outcome in the previous year, and unobserved productive type. The evaluation grid
also includes 8 values of wealth (0, 10000, 20000, 30000, 50000, 100000, 150000, 700000), 6
values of experience (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50), 4 values of education (7, 11, 12, 18), 5 values of lagged
log(hourly wage) (2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4), and 5 values of draws from the standard normal distribution
for the calculation of the wage shocks (-2, -1, 0, 1, 2), giving a total of 57,600 grid points. We
then use a linear interpolation function to predict the value function at values of the state
variables that are not included in the evaluation grid. The results are insensitive to increasing
in the number grid points and changing the interpolation method.
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Appendix IV.2: Likelihood function
The log likelihood function is given by:
L(α,φ,ψ) =
N∑
i=1
log

2∑
e=1
1(e = E)
3∑
j=1
ρj,E
t¯i∏
t=ti
P (li,t|ηi = ηj ,α,φ,ψ)f(Wage∗i,t|ηi = ηj ,ψ)
 , (17)
where N denotes the number of individuals in the sample, α = {α1, α2} denotes the parameters
of the utility function, φ = {φs1, ..., φs6, φo1, ..., φo6} denotes the parameters of the job separation and
job offer probabilities, ψ = {δ, ψ1, ..., ψ6, η1, η2, η3, ρ11, ρ12, ρ21, ρ22, σ2µ, σ2ν} denotes the parameters
of the wage equation (including the variances of wage measurement error and wage shocks),
ti and ti denote individual i’s age when we entered and when he left the sample, respectively,
P (li,t|ηi = ηj ,α,φ,ψ) denotes the probability of the individual’s labor supply outcome at age
t, conditional on being productive ability type j, and f(Wage∗i,t|ηi = ηj ,ψ) is the density of the
sample wage observation, again conditional on the individual’s productive ability type (recall,
the sample log wage is equal to the actual log wage plus a normally distributed measurement
error). To simplify notation, we set f equal to one for unemployed and retired individuals, for
whom the wage is not observed.
Intuitively, each individual contributes to the likelihood the joint probability of his labor
supply outcomes and sample wage values (when observed) over the years that he was in the
sample. Conditional on an individual’s productive ability type, labor supply outcomes and
wages are independent over years. Given that the individual’s productive ability type is unob-
served to the econometrician, the individual’s contribution to the sample likelihood is obtained
by taking the product over the individual’s conditional annual likelihood contributions and then
integrating over the distribution of productive ability.
In the likelihood function, P (li,t|ηi = ηj ,α,φ,ψ) denotes the probability of the individual’s
labor supply outcome at age t, conditional on his productive ability type. To calculate this
probability, we start with joint probability of a consumption choice m, and the individual’s
labor supply outcome, conditional on the individual’s productive ability type and his job offer
and job separation status (which affects the choice set, D(xi,t)):
P (m, li,t|ηi = ηj , JOi,t, JSi,t,α,φ,ψ) =
exp
(
V t(m, li,t,xi,t)
)∑
{c,l}∈D(xi,t) exp
(
V t(c, l,xi,t)
) , (18)
where V t() is the systematic component of the choice-specific value function given by (15).
Summing over the possible consumption choices and integrating over the distributions of job
offers and job separations gives the required probability:
P (li,t|ηi = ηj ,α,φ,ψ) =
∑
m
∫ ∫
P (m, li,t|ηi = ηj , JOi,t, JSi,t,α,φ,ψ)dF (JOi,t)dF (JSi,t), (19)
where F (JOi,t) and F (JSi,t) denote the cumulative distribution functions for job offers and
involuntary job separations, respectively.
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Appendix IV.3: Maximization of the likelihood function
We maximize the likelihood function using a maximum likelihood procedure that utilizes the
numerical gradient and the BHHH Hessian (Berndt et al., 1974). The health transition proba-
bilities and the parameters of the separation probabilities (φs1, ..., φ
s
6) are estimated separately in
a first step and, then, taken as given in the estimation of the full model. Furthermore, in order
to obtain good starting values for the wage process and the type probabilities, we estimate the
wage process together with the type probabilities separately first and, subsequently, use these
estimates as starting values in the estimation of the full model. Based on these starting values
as well as starting values for the utility function and the parameters of the offer probabilities
that are within a reasonable range, the ML procedure converges quickly.
Appendix IV.4: In-sample fit
Figures SWA.1(a)-(c) shows that the estimated model captures accurately the life-cycle profiles
of employment and wages. Figure SWA.2 shows that the estimated model fits the distribution of
wages, both overall and when we split the sample based on years of education. Figure SWA.1(d)
shows that the model predicts a realistic retirement profile. This further supports the model
specification.
Given that we use the estimated model to study the inequality of lifetime earnings and
lifetime income, it is important that the estimated life-cycle model replicates accurately the
persistence in labor supply and earnings that we see in the estimation sample. We explore the
ability of the estimated model to fit the observed persistence in employment and unemployment
by comparing the distributions of individual-level measures of persistence across the estimation
sample and a sample simulated using the estimated model (the notes to Figure SWA.1 describe
the simulated sample). We define employment persistence for an individual as the fraction of an
individual’s time in the sample during which he was employed (e.g., employment persistence is
33% for an individual who was in the sample for 6 years and was employed for 2 of these years).
We use the same method to derive measures of persistence in unemployment. Table SWA.2
shows that the estimated model reproduces the patterns of persistence in employment and
unemployment that we observe in the estimation sample. For example, 12% of individuals in
the estimation sample are employed for 50% or fewer of the years that they were in the sample,
compared to the model prediction of 13.5%. Similarly, among individuals in the estimation
sample, 93.9% spent less than 50% of their time in unemployment, while the model predicts
93.2%.
Similarly, we document the ability of the estimated model to fit the observed persistence
in labor earnings. In particular, for each individual, we calculate the average of his annual
labor earnings over the years during which he was in the sample and employed. We refer to
this as the individual-level average of annual earnings. We then compare the distributions
of the individual-level average of annual labor earnings across the estimation sample and a
sample simulated using the estimated model (the notes to Figure SWA.1 describe the simulated
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Figure SWA.1: Observed and predicted age profiles of labor supply and wages
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Notes: Observed values were calculated using the estimation sample, which contains 3,281 individuals
and 20,843 individual-year observations. Predicted values were calculated using a simulated sample.
The simulated sample was constructed by using the estimated life-cycle model to simulate three life-
cycle trajectories of labor supply and wages for each of the 3,281 individuals in the estimation sample.
Each individual in the simulated sample was endowed with the level of education observed for the
individual in the estimation sample and a productive ability drawn from the estimated distribution of
productivity ability (see Panel III of Table 1). Simulated wage values include measurement error. To
ensure comparability with the estimation sample, predicted values were calculated using only simulated
outcomes from the age values at which the individual was observed in the estimation sample, and when
calculating predicted wage values we further restrict the simulated sample by including only individuals
who are employed in the simulation.
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Figure SWA.2: Observed and predicted distributions of wages
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Notes: Observed values were calculated using the estimation sample. Predicted values were calculated
using a simulated sample (the notes to Figure SWA.1 describe the simulated sample). To ensure com-
parability with the estimation sample, predicted values were calculated using only simulated outcomes
from the age values at which the individual was observed in the estimation sample. For both samples,
we focus on employed individuals aged 20-59 years inclusive.
Table SWA.2: Observed and predicted persistence in labor supply
Percentage of individuals
Percentage of In employment In unemployment
time Observed Predicted Observed Predicted
= 0 7.5 6.8 81.0 76.1
≤ 25 8.5 8.5 88.6 85.9
≤ 50 12.0 13.5 93.9 93.2
≤ 75 16.7 21.0 95.4 96.4
≤ 100 100 100 100 100
Notes: Observed values were calculated using the estimation sample. Predicted
values were calculated using a simulated sample (the notes to Figure SWA.1
describe the simulated sample). To ensure comparability with the estimation
sample, predicted values were calculated using only simulated outcomes from
the age values at which the individual was observed in the estimation sample.
Persistence in a particular labor market state is measured at the individual level
and is defined as the fraction of individual’s time in the sample during which he
was observed in the relevant labor supply state. For both samples, persistence
measures were calculated using individuals aged 20–59 years inclusive.
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Figure SWA.3: Observed and predicted persistence in labor earnings
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Notes: ‘Average annual labor earnings’ is the individual-level average of annual labor earnings over the
years that the individual was in the sample. Individuals with zero average annual labor earnings (i.e.,
those individuals who never worked during the sample period) are excluded from all figures. Across all
individuals, the observed and predicted fractions of individuals with zero average annual labor earnings
are 7.5% and 6.8%, respectively. The corresponding figures are 5.7% and 5% for individuals with at
least twelve years of education and 9.4% and 8.8% for individuals with fewer than twelve years of
education. Also see the notes to Figure SWA.2.
sample). Note, the individual-level average of annual labor earnings combines information
about employment persistence over the life cycle with information about wages, and it therefore
provides a summary measure of individual-level labor earnings dynamics. Figure SWA.3 shows
that the estimated model fits the distribution of individual-level average of annual labor earnings
observed in the estimation sample. Also, when we split the samples based on whether an
individual has less than twelve years of education or at least twelve years of education, the
model continues to fit the distribution of average annual labor earnings within each educational
category.
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Appendix V: Further results
Figure SWA.4: Insurance effects of taxation without wage shocks
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Notes: Smoothed Nadaraya-Watson kernel regressions estimated using the simulated sample described
in the notes to Table 4. ‘Low education’ refers eleven years of education and ‘high education’ refers to
fourteen years of education.
Appendix VI : Robustness checks
Table SWA.3: Robustness of the results in Table 4 to measuring inequality using the squared
coefficient of variation instead of the Theil index
Inequality of lifetime earnings and lifetime income Ratio of between-
(100 × squared coefficient of variation) endowment inequality
Total Within-endowment Between-endowment to total inequality
Earnings 7.68 3.29 4.38 0.57
(Labor earnings+
interest income)
Income 4.02 1.60 2.42 0.60
(Earnings−taxes+transfers)
Share of earnings inequality offset
by the tax-and-transfer system
0.48 0.51 0.45
Supplementary Web Appendix, p. 10
Table SWA.4: Robustness of the results in Table 4 to measuring inequality using the mean
logarithmic deviation instead of the Theil index
Inequality of lifetime earnings and lifetime income Ratio of between-
(100 × mean logarithmic deviation) endowment inequality
Total Within-endowment Between-endowment to total inequality
Earnings 8.75 4.22 4.53 0.52
(Labor earnings+
interest income)
Income 4.06 1.62 2.44 0.60
(Earnings−taxes+transfers)
Share of earnings inequality offset
by the tax-and-transfer system
0.54 0.62 0.46
Table SWA.5: Robustness of the results in Table 5 to measuring inequality using the
squared coefficient of variation instead of the Theil index
Total
Within-endowment Between-endowment
(Insurance) (Redistribution)
Taxes 0.28 0.19 0.35
Unemployment insurance 0.03 0.03 0.02
Disability benefits 0.05 0.14 -0.01
Social assistance 0.12 0.15 0.10
Table SWA.6: Robustness of the results in Table 5 to measuring inequality using the
mean logarithmic deviation instead of the Theil index
Total
Within-endowment Between-endowment
(Insurance) (Redistribution)
Taxes 0.24 0.14 0.34
Unemployment insurance 0.03 0.04 0.02
Disability benefits 0.08 0.18 -0.01
Social assistance 0.19 0.27 0.11
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Table SWA.7: Robustness of the results in Table 7 to measuring inequality using the squared
coefficient of variation instead of the Theil index
∆ Within-endowment inequality
Within-endowment Increased job Decreased job Increased risk of
inequality in baseline separation risk offer rate bad health shocks
Lifetime earnings 3.29 0.17 0.53 0.36
(Labor earnings+
interest income)
Lifetime income 1.60 0.06 0.26 0.13
(Earnings−taxes+transfers)
Share of extra within-
endowment inequality offset
by the tax-and-transfer
system
0.63 0.51 0.62
Table SWA.8: Robustness of the results in Table 7 to measuring inequality using the mean
logarithmic deviation instead of the Theil index
∆ Within-endowment inequality
Within-endowment Increased job Decreased job Increased risk of
inequality in baseline separation risk offer rate bad health shocks
Lifetime earnings 4.22 0.24 1.05 0.55
(Labor earnings+
interest income)
Lifetime income 1.62 0.06 0.32 0.15
(Earnings−taxes+transfers)
Share of extra within-
endowment inequality offset
by the tax-and-transfer
system
0.74 0.69 0.73
Table SWA.9: Robustness of the results in Table 8 to measuring inequality using the squared
coefficient of variation instead of the Theil index
Increased job Decreased job Increased risk of
separation risk offer rate bad health shocks
Taxes 0.10 0.13 0.11
Unemployment insurance 0.06 -0.02 0.02
Disability benefits 0.22 0.11 0.36
Social assistance 0.25 0.29 0.13
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Table SWA.10: Robustness of the results in Table 8 to measuring inequality using the mean
logarithmic deviation instead of the Theil index
Increased job Decreased job Increased risk of
separation risk offer rate bad health shocks
Taxes 0.07 0.09 0.07
Unemployment insurance 0.05 0.01 0.03
Disability benefits 0.24 0.17 0.35
Social assistance 0.37 0.42 0.28
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